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美国运通
四方模式（Four-Party System）
- 持卡人（Cardholder）: 申请并使用卡片进行消费的消费者或企业。
- 发卡行 （Issuer / Issuing Bank）: 持卡人的银行，负责审核客户资质、发卡、给予信用额度、收取卡片年费/利息，并在消费时承担持卡人的坏账风险。
- 收单行（Acquirer / Acquiring Bank）: 商家的银行或专业的第三方收单机构, 负责给商家安装 POS 机/部署支付网关、处理商家收钱的结算业务，并向商家收取手续费。
- 商户（Merchant）: 接受刷卡/扫码支付、售卖商品或服务的商家。
这 4 个主体之间有直接的债权债务、服务关系和资金流转。
而卡组织（Visa / Mastercard / 中国银联）不参与具体的商品买卖，也不承担持卡人的坏账或商家的倒闭风险，只提提供支付清算网络（Payment Network），并向发卡行和收单行收取网络处理费（Data Processing / Network Fees）。
因此，行业在定义商业模型时，只把参与资金分配与风险承担的 4 个端点算作“四方”。
三方模式（Closed-Loop / Three-Party System）
- 持卡人（Cardholder）：申请并使用卡片的消费者或企业。
- 商户（Merchant）：接受刷卡/扫码支付、售卖商品或服务的商家。
- 美国运通（American Express, AMEX）：运通自己独立承担了“发卡行”、“收单行”以及“清算网络”的三重角色。
欧洲《交换费法规》（Interchange Fee Regulation, IFR）
欧洲议会与欧盟理事会于 2015 年 4 月正式通过了《交换费法规》（EU 2015/751），并于 2015 年 12 月起全面生效。这是全球支付史上最具标志性的干预政策之一。
强制封顶（Hard Caps）：
- 消费者借记卡（Debit Cards）：每笔交易的交换费上限设为 0.2%。
- 消费者信用卡（Credit Cards）：每笔交易的交换费上限设为 0.3%。 注：在 IFR 之前，欧洲信用卡交换费普遍在 1.5%~2.0% 左右，封顶政策相当于直接削减了 80%+ 的交换费收入。
豁免范围（Exemptions）：
- 商业卡/企业卡（Corporate Cards） 以及 三方模式卡（如运通 AMEX 自营卡） 暂不受此上限限制（除非 AMEX 授权第三方银行发卡）。
打破“捆绑销售”（Unbundling & Honour All Cards Rule）：
- 废除了卡组织的“接受一家就必须接受全家”规则。商家可以自由选择接受低费率的普通借记卡，而拒收高费率的商业卡或特定高端卡。
- 允许商家在结账时向消费者明确展示不同支付工具的真实成本。
在刷卡交易的利益分配中，交换费是发卡银行（如汇丰、BNP等）拿走的，用来盖过不良资产风险和支付信用卡返现福利。
卡组织最大的收入来源是按笔或按金额收取的“网络服务费（Service Fees）”和“数据处理费（Data Processing Fees）”。欧盟的 IFR 主要是限制给银行的交换费（0.2%~0.3%），并没有封顶卡组织自己收取的网络过路费。
在欧盟 2015 年施行《交换费法规》（IFR）后：
- 真正的受害者：是欧洲的发卡银行。因为原先拿到的 1.5%~2.0% 交换费降到了 0.2%~0.3%，导致银行没钱给持卡人发返现和福利，欧洲持卡人的信用卡积分几乎全线崩盘。
- 真正的受益者：是欧洲的商家。每年省下了数十亿欧元的刷卡手续费。
- Visa 与 Mastercard：通过按笔抽成的“过路费”模式、高费率的跨境/企业卡业务，以及售卖风控软件等增值服务，成功绕过了针对交换费的监管限制，依然在欧洲保持着极其惊人的毛利水平。
美国《信用卡竞争法案》（Credit Card Competition Act, CCCA）
目前美国刷卡交易的综合交换费率高达 1.5% ~ 2.5%（高端卡甚至超 3%）。
Visa 和 Mastercard 共同控制了美国超过 80% 的信用卡清算市场，形成了事实上的“双头垄断（D monopoly）”。
CCCA 法案并没有像欧洲那样直接规定“费率不能超过 0.3%”，而是要求：
强制路由选择（Dual Routing Requirement）：
- 规定资产规模超过 1000 亿美元的大型发卡银行（如 Chase、Bank of America、Citi 等），在其发行的每一张信用卡上，必须提供至少两条不相关的清算网络供商家选择。
- 且这两条网络不能同时是 Visa 和 Mastercard。
引入低成本竞争对手：
- 这意味着大银行发行的 Visa 卡，后台必须同时挂载一条替代网络（如 Discover、American Express 或 NYCE、Star、Pulse 等传统借记/区域清算网关）。
赋予商家清算决定权：
- 当持卡人刷卡时，商家有权选择通过费率更低的那条网络来处理这笔交易，从而强制 Visa 和 Mastercard 为了抢夺订单而下调自己的通道费率。
反对方：发卡银行、卡组织及华尔街（JPMorgan Chase、Citi、Visa、Mastercard、AMEX） 主张：
- 积分与返现将毁灭：银行警告称，如果交换费利润被挤压，美国持卡人最爱的 2% 自由返现、航空里程、免费机场贵宾室、高端开卡礼 将被迫全面取消（重蹈欧洲覆辙）。
- 数据安全与盗刷风控风险：替代的小型清算网络在网络安全、防盗刷和 Token 加密技术上远不如 Visa/MC 完善，强行路由可能导致信用卡欺诈率飙升。
- 伤害中小社区银行：虽然法案名义上免除了 1000 亿资产以下的小银行，但反对者认为这会破坏整个信用卡的清算定价定价体系，间接损害小银行利益。
Article
TheFork connects millions of diners with more than 50,000 restaurants across 11 European countries through its restaurant management, booking and customer engagement platform, alongside a consumer-facing restaurant discovery and reservation app and website.
The proposed acquisition builds on American Express’ broader dining strategy and its successful acquisitions of digital dining platforms Resy and Tock. Together, these platforms are expected to expand American Express’ dining network to 75,000 bookable venues.
“Dining is one of the most important ways people engage with our brand,” said Rafa Marquez, President of International Card Services at American Express.
American Express
- Resy: 北美东海岸与大都市
- Tock: 北美 & 全球高端场景
- TheFork: 欧洲
Booking Holdings (OpenTable)：全球最大流量池、商旅出行生态与 Visa 合作。
DoorDash (SevenRooms)：主打到店预订与外送生态的结合、B 端数据掌控。
According to Nilson, an industry bible, in 1974 the amount of money for purchases channelled through American Express was equivalent to 50% of what went through MasterCard and 70% of what went through Visa. By 2016, those ratios had shrunk to 30% and 14%.
Competitive pressure looms on all sides. MasterCard’s market capitalisation is twice that of American Express; Visa’s, three times as big. PayPal, spun off from eBay in 2015 and run by a former American Express executive, has a tiny fraction of Amex’s revenues and profits but on the eve of the earnings announcement passed it in market value (see chart). Its sales and profits have grown much faster, and it was born online.
Competition abroad is just as keen. American Express entered Asia early and once had an enviable position there, but its presence has faded. In 2007 it sold (to Standard Chartered) a private bank created almost a century ago that had languished from inattention. Japan’s JCB has issued almost as many cards (but still accounts for far less in transactions). China’s UnionPay boasts the world’s biggest transaction volume, eight times that of American Express, and 55% of cards issued globally.
In this noisy hothouse, Mr Chenault deserves respect for keeping American Express healthy. It has supported its market share through deals with banks and other financial institutions that can now issue American Express cards (and generate fees by transacting through Amex’s systems). In the past decade the number of businesses accepting its cards has doubled. But these victories have come at a cost. Twenty-five years ago American Express collected a 3.2% fee on every transaction, according to Sanford Bernstein, an investment research firm. Now, it makes less than 1.8%. Competitive pressure will squeeze this further.
In the past, merchants were willing to pay for American Express transactions because its cardholders were well-off and willing to spend. But now large banks are going after these customers. JPMorgan Chase and Citigroup, both with card businesses headed by ex-Amexers, have issued cards that provide benefits broadly regarded as better than those from American Express. Soon Bank of America will follow. Banks have also taken aim at lucrative co-branding deals carrying exclusive rewards for customers. In 2015 American Express lost one such deal with Costco, a large retailer that accounted for 10% of its transaction volume, to Citigroup. Another, with JetBlue, an airline, went to Barclays.
To rely less on revenue from transaction fees, American Express has become more banklike, lending more. Net interest income made up 18% of revenues in 2012 and should bring in 28% in 2018, predicts Nomura/Instinet, a brokerage. That has looked good lately, because funds have been cheap and credit quality high, but the environment may be changing. Citigroup and JPMorgan Chase, among others, began expanding their consumer-loan portfolios in 2015. Now quality may be worsening. In the two most recent quarters, analysts were surprised by the size of American Express’s provisions for credit losses. Other banks also increased provisions.